Abstract This paper explores links between global financial imbalances and tensions around reserve currency along with climate change. Currently, risky levels of private and public debts coexist with vast amounts of savings that ''do not know where to go.'' Longterm climate-oriented financial products could enhance investors' confidence in low-carbon projects (LCP) and channel to them large amounts of private savings. The paper outlines a financial architecture, the cornerstone of which is an agreement on the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) integrated into a project's appraisal and acting as a surrogate for a carbon price. This SCC would be the value of carbon certificates issued by the government and delivered to banks to issue credit facilities reducing the risk-adjusted costs of LCPs. These carbon certificates could be gradually transformed into legal reserve assets of the banks after verification of the reality of the projects. Finally, the paper considers whether such certificates would be recognized as genuine international reserve assets, backed by the rising value of carbon over time. It shows how emerging countries could then diversify their foreign exchange reserves through an asset based on the international recognition of climate as a global public good.
Introduction
After the failure of COP-15 in Copenhagen (2009) to find a successor to the Kyoto Protocol, the Cancun Agreement (COP-16) calls for ''a paradigm shift towards building a low-carbon society that offers substantial opportunities and ensures continued high growth and sustainable development'' (paragraph 10). It confirms the failure of finding an agreement within a burden-sharing paradigm (Hourcade et al. 2008) , which boils down to asking the question: ''who uses the remainder of the emissions budget?'' For developing countries, this paradigm contradicts the sustainable development perspective of the UN-FCCC (Rio 1992) since it requires their emerging middle classes to slow their access to decent living conditions and relegate the world priority of alleviating poverty to a later era.
As a keystone of an alternative approach, the Cancun Agreement establishes a Green Climate Fund devoted in part to funding low-carbon development projects (LCPs), their adaptation and capacity buildup. This fund is a precondition, long called for by developing countries, 1 for setting up, ''one or more market-based mechanisms to enhance the costeffectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions'' (paragraph 80).
Given the reluctance of countries like the United States, Canada and Russia to adopt binding emission targets, creating a demand for emissions credits by developed countries remains unattainable in the near future. This paper tackles the contradiction between this absence of worldwide carbon markets 2 and the necessary scaling-up of climate finance within a context where governments of developed countries face fiscal constraints and banks are obliged to make deleveraging efforts.
It starts from the observation that, given the orders of magnitude at stake, climate finance can no longer remain marginal, and that private investments in development projects, whatever their content, are primarily constrained by the perception of high uncertainty about returns. It suggests that financial devices preferentially reducing the investment risks of LCPs could unleash margins of freedom, which would give them a boost even in the transitory absence of carbon prices and that the design and deployment of these devices cannot be made without taking into account the evolution of the overall financial system.
Linking these two sensitive issues may appear to be a diplomatic non-starter. But ignoring that ''social and economic development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries and that a low-carbon development strategy is indispensable to sustainable development'' (paragraph 6) is also a diplomatic non-starter. After all, if reorienting part of the world's savings toward low-carbon energy, transportation and the housing infrastructure can trigger a wave of sustainable growth (UNEP 2009 ) that is less exposed to financial ups and downs, this link is worth examining.
We first specify the nature of the difficulties climate finance must confront: defining the appropriate form of the multilateral Green Climate Fund, hedging the serious risks of distrust if raised expectations are not fulfilled. We then show that an agreement at a future COP on the value of the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) can help overcome these risks and improve the overall economic efficiency of multilateral and voluntary initiatives of Parties to leverage investments for low-carbon infrastructures. We then examine how, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, recognition by the IMF of a carbon-based international reserve asset as a counterpart to countries' investments in LCPs can make it possible to secure future economic recovery and the stability of the monetary and financial system.
We do not claim to depict a full-fledged proposal; we simply mean to embark the reader upon reflections aimed at breaking the circle of distrust that has so far frustrated attempts to find a successor to the Kyoto Protocol.
2 After Cancun: making the paradigm shift happen
The reasons for an impossible agreement upon a world carbon price
A cap-and-trade architecture for climate policies is justified by the theoretical merits of a unique carbon price around the world. But after years of repeated failures in enforcing this principle, it may be wise, instead of blaming political and diplomatic vagaries, to recall the alerts against too hasty a policy interpretation of economic wisdom (Aldy et al. 2003; Aldy and Stavins 2007) . 3 Economists indeed know that valid recipes in a first best world (i.e., with competitive frictionless markets and lump-sum transfers to compensate adverse redistributive impacts) may not lead to Pareto improving outcomes if applied to a real (second best) world (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956) . 4 The last IPCC report for example places a caveat 5 on the optimistic results of the modeling literature, which suggests that, with a unique carbon price, even the tightest climate targets can be met with only a limited percentage of GDP losses over the century. The RECIPE project (Edenhofer et al. 2009 ) confirms that, in case of imperfect expectations, technical inertia and imperfect markets, a carbon-price-only framework hardly offers a palatable deal for emerging and developing countries. Indeed, in a transitory phase any significant rise in carbon price would severely hurt their low and middle classes as well as their basic industries at the moment of economic takeoff. The problem is that one cannot but be skeptical about the willingness of OECD countries to grant large compensatory transfers (by means of aid or generous emissions caps) to offset these adverse impacts.
This problem is often underestimated because of a misinterpretation of modeling results. Many of them assume perfect expectations which means, as illustrated in Fig. 1 , that economic agents ''see'' the entire trajectory of carbon prices equal to the SCC along the optimal least cost pathway to achieve a given climate objective. They thus make decisions today on long-lived investments as a function of, say 200$/tCO 2 in 2080, and apply a low 10$/tCO 2 to the current generation. In the real world, however, economic agents act in a more myopic fashion because long-term markets are missing and because 3 The Kyoto protocol for example is improperly presented as a unique price framework. It basically consists of quota exchange among countries, which are in turn free to implement unilateral domestic climate policies. Consequently, it implies a world carbon price but not a unique carbon price (Guesnerie 2010) . 4 If there are some constraints within the GE system that prevent the attainment of at least one of the conditions of Pareto optimality, then the attainment of the other Pareto optimal conditions is no longer necessarily welfare improving (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956) . 5 ''Most models use a global least cost approach to mitigation portfolios and with universal emissions trading, assuming transparent markets, no transaction cost, and thus perfect implementation of mitigation measures throughout the 21st century'' (AR4 WGIII SPM Box 3). On differences between 1st best and 2nd best economics in the field (see Stern 2010) .
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carbon price signals in sectors as critical as transportation and building infrastructure are swamped by many other distorted economic and political signals.
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This causes an expectation gap that is all the more harmful because developing countries are going to build a significant amount of infrastructure within the next two decades and will soon be locked into carbon intensive developmental patterns. There is thus a narrow window of opportunity for avoiding this bifurcation by shifting the content of investments in energy, building, transport and end-use equipment (Shalizi and Lecocq 2009 ).
This shift is primarily a matter of bridging the expectation gap. Doing so only by means of the carbon price signal implies very high carbon prices in the short term to cover the ''noise'' of other signals (see Fig. 1 ) such as distorted real estate prices. This will exacerbate transition costs. There is therefore a need to mobilize a broader set of economic signals (energy pricing, real estate and land prices, labor markets and risk premium) together with reforms of regulatory regimes of infrastructure sectors such as energy and transportation sectors. Governments will have to enact such policies for a far larger set of domestic reasons than climate change (Shukla and Dhar 2011) .
We thus examine how an international agreement on the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) could help bridge (part of) this expectation gap and reorient infrastructure investments today without the immediate adverse effects of high carbon prices on income distribution and industry. Fig. 1 The expectation gap. Agents today consider the carbon price a, and do not anticipate its evolution beyond t 1 . In case of full confidence in public policies and clear perception of carbon price signals, they see the entire trajectory O. If carbon prices are blurred by other imperfect signals (including low confidence in public policies), a carbon price c [ b has to be launched. It leads to the L curve in the case of endogenous technical change 6 In addition, there are many views about the potential for reducing market and institutional imperfections. Each view leads to a specific trend of SCC and the uncertainty about which view will politically prevail is one major source of ''myopic'' decisions.
Climate finance, under a form of double bind?
The Cancun Green Climate Fund and other forms of climate finance are necessary tools to bridge this expectation gap (Müller 2011) . But they may be victims of misunderstandings if they are not inserted into a broader view of developmental issues 7 and if a credible response is not given to ''donor fatigue.'' This fatigue cannot but be exacerbated in a context of ''depression economics'' and access of large emerging countries to the rank of capital exporters.
It is unlikely that the US $100 billion per year by 2020 appraised by (Smith et al. 2011 ) and (Olbrisch et al. 2011) or the US $140-$175 billion a year by 2030 appraised by the World Development Report (and corresponding to US $264-$563 billion upfront financing needs (World Bank 2009) for both mitigation and adaptation can be covered by grants from developed countries given their current financial fragility. Current ODA is only $100 billion per year today and, if public grants can certainly cover adaptation costs, mobilizing private finance is needed for large scale mitigation investments.
The above figures show that climate finance cannot be considered as a marginal issue. We must stress however that the incremental investment costs to be covered do not confront major macroeconomic constraints. The World Energy Outlook 2009 by the IEA evaluates the incremental investment costs for a 450 ppm GHG concentration scenario as amounting to only 3 % of total GFCF (Gross Fixed Capital Formation) assuming a world growth rate of 3 % over the period (own calculations). This is because the higher upfront costs of low-carbon technologies are in part compensated for by a lower energy demand due to higher energy efficiency and changes in consumption behaviors. The same compensation operates between lower demand and higher capital intensity in the transport sector.
We are thus not facing a problem of global capital shortage or sacrifice of current consumption.
8 Considerable amounts of capital are indeed available in developed countries' pension funds, in revenues derived from all kinds of rents (oil, gas, real estate and land) and in the very high savings rates of large emerging economies. It is, indeed, primarily a capital redirection problem, and new margins of freedom for a palatable deal between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries would appear if it were possible to enhance investors' confidence in alternative content of the bulk of infrastructure projects.
CDM experiences (taking place in about 30 Annex I and 80 host countries) teach us major lessons in this respect. First, the magnitude of generated cash flows depends on the demand of carbon offset by countries subject to emissions commitments, which is precisely today's main cause of uncertainty. In the aftermath of the financial crisis and of the Copenhagen failure, CDM contracted by 59 % in 2009 (Kossoy and Ambrosi 2010). 9 Second, revenues from carbon trading can be used to support all kinds of projects, even those which are carbon intensive. 10 Third, cash flows which enhance the profitability of 7 Of which, President Lula's response to a goodwill European offer at Copenhagen is symptomatic: ''in these circumstances we do not want your money.'' 8 About the possibility to avoid a trade-off between present consumption and future climate see Foley (Foley 2009) . 9 In addition, two other sources of uncertainty limit the volume of available transfers: (a) the possible existence of ceilings on carbon imports, consistent with the ''supplementary condition'' of article 17.bis of the Kyoto Protocol, (b) the inexistence of a sharing of the proceeds levied on primary and secondary carbon trading. 10 We set aside here the criticisms on the use of a counterfactual emissions baseline which casts doubts on the effectiveness of emissions reductions.
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LCPs cannot overcome the financial barriers of upfront investments because they are generated only when emission reductions are observed, which is well after the funding of the project (De Gouvello and Zelenko 2010) . Contrary to the CDM, the Public Finance Mechanisms (PFMs) developed by several financial organizations 11 and bilateral funds bring upfront and technical assistance grants to LCPs from their incubation to their operational phase. However, as the Kyoto mechanisms, they bet on LCPs eventually being rewarded, in addition to non-monetary local cobenefits, by the revenues from significant carbon prices. Moreover, they provide grants, which do not finance the bulk of projects ) and cover only the ''extra risk'' of LCPs, assuming that the bulk is already funded and has met a certain risk-adjusted return criterion.
This may explain why the current magnitude of PFMs pales in comparison with the funding needs (UNEP 2010a, b) and why the leverage ratio of public money on private investment (High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing 2010) is lower than the usually observed ones from traditional PFMs. Leverage ratios of PFMs dedicated to LCPs barely reach the range US $2 to US $4 for every US $1 of public money 12 compared with the range US $3 to US $15 for traditional PFMs (Maclean et al. 2008; Ward et al. 2009 ).
Currently, the scaling-up of climate finance is trapped in a form of double bind. On the one hand, it is one precondition for breaking the circle of distrust between Annex B and non-Annex B countries and for proving the capacity of the former to assume their past responsibility in global warming. On the other hand, in the absence of a global arrangement, bilateral initiatives, or even proposals like taxes on bunkers or flight transports, may look like symbolic tricks, leading to fragment assistance and ultimately creating a source of inefficiency and distrust. To break this double bind, let us start by noting that low-carbon development projects are confronted with the usual risks of all development projects: technical and regulatory uncertainty, currency risks, long pay-back periods and volatility of market prices. Their specific drawback is that these risks are enhanced by the uncertainty on carbon prices, by higher upfront costs due to higher capital intensity of low-carbon equipment and by higher technological risks of less mature techniques (Grantham Research Institute 2009) .
Total costs of projects are comprised of their upfront costs, operating costs and the costs of the perceived risks. Let us assume (see Fig. 2 ) that upfront costs of a LCP are 10 % higher than those of a BAU project and its intrinsic, non-carbon-related risk amounts to 20 (respectively 10 for the BAU project). The present value of operating costs of the LCP is lower than the BAU but not low enough to compensate for its excess upfront cost. Let us now assume that the present value of the penalty the BAU project would pay in case of a climate agreement upon a carbon price is 10. Assuming a 25 % subjective probability for such agreement, the carbon-related risk of the BAU project amounts to 2.5. Then, as the difference in total risk-adjusted costs of the two projects reaches 12.5 points, the LCP must reduce its risk-adjusted costs by 9 % to be competitive. 14 For historical reasons, climate finance has thus far focused on covering the incremental upfront costs of LCPs. 15 There are however other means to lower LCP's total risk-adjusted costs:
• Increasing the chances of an agreement upon the implementation of a carbon price: a full certainty case makes the risk-adjusted costs of the BAU projects become 134. If such agreement took the form of a carbon trading system, it would even turn the carbon-related risk into a source of revenue for the LCP, tilting the balance in favor of the LCP as soon as the carbon revenue exceeds 5.
• Addressing the non-carbon price risks of the LCP: halving them by means of public guarantees will give the same result as paying the totality of excess upfront costs (10) through public grants for example (our proposal based on carbon certificates presented in Sect. 3 belongs to this category of climate finance mechanisms). In this example, additional support (?2.5) is required to help the LCP reach the breakeven point. Figure 2 is basically a thought experiment and the numbers used should be considered as purely informative. There is indeed a critical lack of information about LCPs financial performances and risk perception by investors. 15 On top of the difficulties of measuring these 'incremental costs', this notion makes the selection of negative costs projects difficult; the demonstration of transaction costs explaining why projects that should but will not be funded in practice is indeed always a very controversial exercise.
• Blending the tools and widening the scope of public intervention in order to address the bulk of the financing needs of LCPs and reduce the overall risk-adjusted costs of LCPs.
Hence, public support will be needed to make LCPs competitive, but the challenge is firstly to design innovative instruments aimed at lowering risk perception of LCPs by private investors so as to maximize the leverage effect of each $ of public money in a context where carbon prices are unlikely to rise. De Gouvello and Zelenko (2010) , for example, propose a low-carbon development facility (LCDF) that would fill up a Green Fund able to issue emitting $100 billion AAA green bonds per year to fund LCPs, which are individually rated BBB. This is the right way to go; however, as it stands, this proposal has two drawbacks: it implies a one shot budgetary cost of $68 billion (the paid-in-capital of the fund) and can be suspected of crowding out other types of development assistance. Moreover, it incorporates no guarantee that the collected money will yield cost effective abatements. In addition to stringent monitoring of the projects, this guarantee cannot be brought without a surrogate of carbon prices.
An agreed upon Social Cost of Carbon as a surrogate of a carbon price
A natural candidate to a surrogate of a carbon price is the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) and its evolution over time. The SCC is theoretically the set of shadow prices of carbon along a constrained GHG emission trajectory and its value increases over time as one approaches carbon constraints as long as very cheap carbon-free techniques are not available at large scale. This is the important point because, incorporated in projects appraisals, it would counterbalance the effect of the discount rate and enhance the social value of long-lived infrastructure projects.
The modeling literature displays a wide range of value for the SCC (between US$0/ tCO 2 and US$240/tCO 2 in 2030 in IPCC AR4) because of differences in (a) the choice of the decision framework (cost-benefit with a monetary assessment of climate change damage versus cost-efficiency with a predetermined temperature target) (b) assumptions about the level and pace of climate change damage, the costs and pace of deployment of low-carbon technologies, the pure time preference and the long-term growth rates. Although integrated modeling can help defining a narrower corridor of plausible values of the SCC at various points in time, the choice of this value will be ultimately political in nature 16 and translate the willingness of governments to act for mitigating climate change. We believe that an agreement on a SCC is low demanding in terms of diplomatic accord at the UNFCCC. It does not entail the same drawbacks as an agreement leading to a carbon price to be imposed immediately to all world human activities. It will, similarly to what the French tradition calls a prix directeur, be used to bridge the expectation gap by indicating the long-term value of the ton of avoided GHGs emission and increase the relative attractiveness of LCPs with no direct immediate burden for private agents. It will also help maximizing the overall economic efficiency of the Green Climate Fund and of any other climate initiatives, while sending a comprehensive signal to investors and, upstream, to R&D, city planning and infrastructure managers.
What remains to be demonstrated is what device should use this SCC in a credible enough manner to encourage governments, at least a coalition of few willing countries, to create new channels for funding LCPs and increasing their participation to the endowment of the Green Climate Fund.
Turning the Social Cost of Carbon into a fulcrum for climate finance
The basic principle of the solution proposed here for overcoming the gap between public budget constraints and upfront costs of any ambitious climate policy consists in governments injecting more liquidity into the economy with the help of Central Banks, provided that the money is used to fund LCPs, 17 and redirecting private capital toward LCPs. No immediate ''hard cash'' needs to be disbursed by governments which provide instead a public guarantee on a precise type of credit. The question of the risk of ''delayed'' payment by governments will be addressed later. The question is how to use this guarantee to differentiate prudential rules of the banking system contingent on the nature of the projects and to attract savings from institutions such as pension funds without generating uncontrolled money creation and ''carbon bubbles.'' This is precisely where the SCC enters the game.
3.1 The SCC and the mechanics of climate finance scaling-up in an adverse context There are two channels to scale up climate finance: encouraging banks to provide loans to LCPs and bringing institutional investors into the low-carbon sector. Let us examine them in turn before sketching a possible overall architecture.
Bringing the banking system in
Given current constraints of the banking system, two levers can prompt the banks to become involved in LCPs: new credit facilities through an increase in their legal reserves and innovative means of recapitalizing them in a context of broad deleveraging. If the mitigation of climate change is recognized as something of value by a country, then the government could activate these two levers by creating ''carbon certificates'' recognized by the Central Bank as genuine reserves.
18 Instead of being valued at market prices like gold or foreign currencies, the value of these certificates would be set at the conventional value of the SCC. Governments could then deliver them to the banking system, preferably but not exclusively to development banks, in proportion to expected carbon abatement yielded by the projects they support.
As depicted in Tables 1 and 2 , carbon certificates accrue to banks' assets holdings and are turned gradually into new legal reserves (and therefore appear as carbon certificate deposits in Central Bank liabilities) or carbon equity after due verification that projects have been launched and completed. One possible mechanism of this transformation of carbon certificates into legal reserves in order to preserve the financial and environmental integrity of the system is given in Appendix.
17 Such a precondition is crucial to controlling the induced monetary multiplier and making sure that the money is effectively invested instead of being only used by the banks to restore their balance and may eventually unleash macroeconomic benefits in terms of potential growth. 18 Provided that this operation is conducted consistently with domestic practices about operating rules of the Central Banks.
This transformation is critical to incite banks to add carbon finance to the short list of their priorities. They would perceive carbon finance as a way to gradually increase their legal reserves and would be incited to release, for instance, regular deposits to the Central Bank in order to develop LCP-targeted credit facilities. The other lever consists in turning carbon certificates into carbon equity. This operation would help the banks (at least cost) to comply with their prudential ratio (Basel III) or expand their activity depending on their previous situation.
The counterpart of these liabilities on the assets side of the Central Bank's balance sheet is the ''carbon assets'' valued at the SCC. Setting aside the question of the international liquidity of these assets, their issuance could be a unilateral decision to transform the avoided carbon emissions into tangible assets because the international community has recognized that it is something of reliable value.
The attribution by the Central Bank of a conventional value to this carbon asset in the same fashion as gold under the Bretton Woods regime, for instance, does not infringe on its independence. It is justified by an upstream UN agreement on the SCC and backed on the existence of effective emission reductions. Still this poses a problem of accounting methodology, which we address later.
Back to the example in Fig. 2 , if we assume that public funds could take on half the upfront excess costs (5), our proposal of CC issuance has to yield an additional reduction of risk-adjusted costs of at least 8 points in order to make the LCP competitive. Then the LCP will be funded if it can be demonstrated that the CC delivered to the banks that account for a share of the amount of abated carbon emissions valued at the conventional SCC is worth at least 8 (which is a likely and even conservative value given that carbon penalty for the BAU project is expected to be 10). If such is the case, after verification of the completion of the project, these 8 will be dispatched between bank's legal reserves and carbon equity. If the project does not meet its carbon abatement objectives, then only a fraction of these 8 will be turned into legal reserves or carbon equity. The project would thus have benefited from the loan while the bank would not get extra legal reserves or carbon equity as expected. 
Bringing institutional investors in
Launching the mechanism demands the governments to back, through carbon certificates, the credit risks of LCPs. The crux of the matter, to enhance the power of the system and its financial viability, is however to redirect toward LCPs the funds that would otherwise be invested in BAU projects. With carbon certificates backed on the SCC, the banking system holds an operational tool to back safe climate-oriented financial products (bonds 19 or liquid deposit accounts) with a slightly higher return than the return of other safe products (e.g., gilt-edged securities, savings bank accounts, government bonds, interest bearing accounts).
This may be attractive for households that allocate a share of their savings to safe investments and/or have a non-negligible ethical motivation to financially contribute to ''great causes. '' 20 Besides, institutions like Sovereign Wealth Funds, public private and corporate pension funds, insurance companies, endowments and investment management companies could be interested in AAA-rated ''climate colored'' bonds (such as the green bonds of the World Bank) if they offer a slightly higher return than regular bonds. The moment is timely in the aftermath of the financial crisis since households and some of the institutional investors are becoming more careful about speculative investments.
Closing the system
As pictured in Fig. 3 , the carbon-targeted financial back up by governments and the mobilization of private savings allows banks to provide loans directly to LCPs or to specialized funds meant to operate the selection of LCPs and create lower risk portfolios of projects. With carbon certificates used as financial counterparts of effective LCPs, we can, as in De Gouvello and Zelenko (2010), design least cost devices to enhance the credibility of LCPs portfolios.
However, this type of sleight-of-hand finance logically arouses suspicion because of its responsibility in today's financial crisis. It may indeed conceal a systemic risk through creating monetary inflation and incentives to invest in new speculative assets. Figure 4 pictures the three legitimate concerns that have to be responded to: (i) lax monetary creation under the pretext of carbon savings, (ii) low quality of LCPs both in terms of development and carbon abatement, (iii) generation of ''carbon bubbles''.
A moral hazard problem arises for both banks and project developers faced with the incentive to fund low environmental quality LCPs, for the former because carbon certificates increase their legal reserves, for the latter because they are interested in overestimating the mitigation contribution of their project.
Securing LCPs environmental and developmental quality
The reliability of this architecture rests primarily on its capacity to certify that LCPs make a real contribution to development, economic growth and emission reductions. The CDM experience suggests pessimistic response to this regard. Accurate project-based accounting 19 AGF (2010) sees the green bonds in development banks' capital as a good option for climate finance. of avoided emissions on a case-by-case basis is almost out of reach 21 since avoided emissions are calculated from a counterfactual and controversial baseline and since indirect effects of investments cannot be easily integrated into project appraisals (Shalizi and Fig. 4 The SCC and the credibility of a climate finance architecture Fig. 3 Sketching a possible climate finance architecture 21 The CDM projects' approval involves heavy complexities due to the fact that accounting methodologies have to guarantee the additionality of each project to prevent issued CERs undermining existing carbon markets with ''fake'' emission reductions. Lecocq 2009). However, the issue at stake here is not a problem of ''project-based additionality'' like in the CDM but a problem of statistical additionality that is to guarantee that the pool of projects supported by the system will yield a total of carbon abatement higher than what would have otherwise occurred.
Three cases may appear ( Fig. 3 ): (i) projects pay for themselves, the carbon certificates system would thus have only helped to bridge a credibility gap inhibiting their adoption so far; (ii) projects are able to pay back their loan if a cost of carbon appears in whatever form, hopefully higher that the ex-ed SCC; (iii) projects are in default payment because of mismanagement, technical failure, or because they actually had little chance of success. The challenge is to trigger a wave of investments in a situation of ignorance of the precise outcome of each individual project and to reach a portfolio of LCPs both economically viable and environmentally efficient. Focus on very high accuracy in the allocation of carbon certificates would end up freezing investments while laxity would lead to subsidizing projects that would have been funded anyway.
It is not the scope of this concept paper to delve more deeply into the technical principles apt to secure this statistical additionality. But the basic principles would be to (i) define a taxonomy of LCPs (size, technology, time horizon); (ii) determine the time profile of the contribution of each type of project to carbon abatement (for example railways, buildings, fossil free energy); (iii) calculate the present value of this contribution and thus the amount of carbon certificates allocated to each kind of LCP (by dividing the present value of projects by the SCC at the date of project launching).
Let A CO2 be the estimated time profile of a project's CO 2 abatement. If t 0 denotes the date of the launching of the project, N the project life-time and i the discount rate, the present value of these CO 2 abatements can be computed as follows:
Both the discount rate to be retained and the contribution of each type of project are in principle dependent on a given long run scenario. 22 This implies that the flow of avoided carbon attached to each category of project will ultimately be conventional and set by political compromise. However, integrated models have accumulated sufficient information to provide orders of magnitude of the avoided carbon emissions associated, for a given growth scenario, to main types of LCPs (hydro-power, solar or wind power plants, transport infrastructure, building insulation, etc.). These values could be reasonably bound by systematic model comparison and sensitivity analysis, through an international expert committee, and provide benchmarks for compromise values. 23 Actually, the most and only reliable hedge against costly arbitrariness and extreme laxity is that (i) only a share of estimated avoided carbon emissions would be allocated under the form of carbon certificates; (ii) this is a learning process in which the allocation 22 Beyond the pending debate between the normative low rate (Stern 2006 ) and a rate consistent with observed behaviors (Nordhaus 2007) , we remind the reader that in integrated assessment models the discounting is in fact dominated by key parameters of economic scenarios and assumptions about damage (Weitzman 2009); Stern 2006; Perrissin Fabert et al. 2010 ) in case of uncertainty on future growth the lower discount rates dominate the calculation (Newel and Pizer 2001). There is thus a consensus that the appropriate discount rate in these matters should be far lower than the interest rates prevailing in existing capital markets. 23 In addition, this committee could build on the CDM experience to refine global assessments and adapt them to local circumstances. of carbon certificates could be changed at given points in time (with no retroactivity on past allocations).
Let a be the share of this theoretical abatement that the Central Bank is willing to consider. 24 The number of carbon certificates (CC) attached to a project would thus be:
In the same spirit, the monitoring of projects (and possible invalidation of the carbon certificates) has to rely on simple observable criteria to assess the degree of effectiveness of the project in comparison with its ex-ante objectives (in terms of carbon emissions when this is possible, in terms of indicators of physical achievement for transportation or building infrastructure). Building upon the experience of the CDM, it will bind public exposure of LCPs to risks and enhance audit credibility. One legitimate concern is that financial intermediaries will be necessary to create assets apt to diversify the risks and to finance portfolios of LCPs. They may generate what Timothy Geithner calls the ''non-bank financial system,'' 26 which facilitates the emergence of bubbles like the housing bubble and the dramatic rise of private debts that put the financial system at risk. Actually, the risk of a ''carbon bubble'' followed by a ''carbon subprime'' crisis if it turns out that LCPs do not bring the expected paybacks, is very low. Indeed, while the increase in the value of real estate assets rested on very low interest rates and was unbound, the SCC value would be known with certainty. In other words, the emergence of a ''carbon bubble'' through the assets acting as non-bank banks is blocked by the very existence of a predetermined value of carbon.
The system we have thus far sketched incorporates two mechanisms that should avoid the monetary flexibility granted by carbon assets to result in monetary inflation and systemic risks for the financial and banking system: credit and financial products attracting private savings are backed by carbon certificates authenticated by sound control procedures.
Certainly, if the financing of LCPs does not increase potential output as much as expected, a risk of inflation acceleration has to be considered. In fact, in addition to the traditional monetary policy tools (legal reserve requirements and the interest rate for instance), a second tool could be activated with carbon certificates acting as legal reserves. This is the coefficient a in Eq. 2, which adjusts the number of carbon certificates available for each type of project.
Risk assessment of climate-oriented financial products also deserves to be carried out because obviously default payments of a significant share of LCPs cannot be totally excluded. This would force governments to back the debt in the last resort and eventually provide ''hard cash'' as investors would call upon the public guarantee. Excess default 24 We took a = 0.5 in the numerical illustration presented in the previous subsection. 25 One could also allow NGOs and non-energy-intensive sectors (which will not receive carbon-based public support) to contest public audit reports by the official body of control on the grounds of their own investigations. 26 A non-bank bank promises ''ready access to cash for those who place money in its care, even while investing most of that money in assets that cannot be liquidated at a moment's notice. But, unlike the banking system, it is not submitted to protections like prudential rules and insurance deposits.'' This paves the way to banking in a shadow (Krugman 2008). payments might thus increase countries' debts and oblige countries' taxpayers to later pay a debt service due to misdirected and mismanaged projects. Still, even though it should be granted in further numerical investigations, we believe that such risk should not be excessive as collected savings do not flow toward speculative assets but long-term productive projects that yield actual wealth and environmental value tracked through avoided CO 2 . Here, again both the coefficient a in Eq. 2 and the amount of carbon certificates issued by the government make it possible to control the level of risk for taxpayers.
To sum up, the credibility of carbon-oriented financial products will eventually depend on the evolution of their market prices which would depend in turn on the efficiency of low-carbon investments and the quality of policies implemented to enhance the profitability of these investments (railways, high environmental quality of housing, etc.).
Regarding the liquidity issue of CC turned into either legal reserves or carbon equity, it is important to note that CC have a face value given by the SCC. Even though we assume that CC can be traded in a secondary market, their price, such as prices of bonds in normal conditions (this means in case of no bankruptcy of the emitter), is likely to stay in a rather narrow margin of fluctuation around the face value. Ultimately, any holder of CC can sell this asset to the Central Bank at its face value. This is why the risk will be underwritten in last resort by governments but may stay below controllable levels.
Eventually, the policy risk of this mechanism might also be low. The simple fact that it is relatively low demanding in terms of diplomatic and fiscal resources means that it may not be undermined by policy instability. It can be even argued that this policy risk will be lower than in a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system. This scheme will incite indeed governments to conduct policies apt to minimize default risks of projects by enforcing credible and steady climate policies.
Climate finance and sustainable globalization
Let us now assume that an expanding group of countries adopt this mechanism in view of its extension at a global level as soon as there is an agreement under the UNFCCC on the value of the SCC and on the allocation and monitoring principles of carbon certificates. Still, given the orders of magnitude at stake, the generalization of carbon certificates represents a targeted liquidity injection, which cannot but have systemic implications on the monetary and financial system and ultimately macroeconomic consequences. The question is whether these implications will be positive or negative.
The status of carbon certificates in an evolving monetary and financial order
The financial crisis in 2008 revealed the failure of the Basel process to set prudential rules apt to control the innovative capacity of the finance industry and avoid banking in a shadow. As a matter of utmost urgency, the US and the EU governments have socialized ''bad debts'' since 2008 and the international community is in search of tools to stabilize the international financial system.
To understand how LCP-targeted monetary flexibility may be one item of the toolbox, let us remember that modern monetary and banking systems rely on the commerce of promises 27 with a significant disconnection between the scale of the promises of funded economic initiatives and the existence of preexisting counterparts. We are far removed from the time when gold and silver of the Lombards' strongbox backed the first letters of credit.
The art of managers of the modern system consists in finding the right balance between a risky laxity, releasing speculative bubbles with significant social costs when they burst, and an extreme rigor that inhibits economic activity. Such an art plays on conventional indicators such as the ratio between loans, liquid reserves and authorized capital, or the payment into the deposit insurance system. The only ''strongbox'' behind this commerce of promises is essentially the working capacities of nations, which guarantees that something of value is eventually created when the money is spent. But the crashes of Iceland, Dubaï, Greece and Ireland and the difficulties of Portugal, Spain and Italy demonstrate that the content of this strongbox is not unlimited when the creation of actual wealth falls short of the promises circulating on financial markets, including in the form of speculative bubbles.
We will not go back to the times of the Lombard bankers or of the ''gold exchange standard.'' However, debate is open as to what should be considered as a reserve asset, including the possible use of SDRs as international reserve money. 28 In our proposal, one theoretical advantage of carbon certificates is that they are neither backed by preexisting wealth nor by undetermined promises, but rather by the guarantee that something of recognized value will eventually be created (insulated houses, renewable energies, rail or waterways).
The idea of creating a new international reserve asset based on CO 2 emission reduction may look odd. It is however no more far-fetched than the old convention that makes gold one of the very first reserve assets accepted worldwide. Given the magnitude of both environmental concerns and the financial crisis, it is perhaps timely to open up innovative avenues to address the global climate externality. Symptomatically, IMF experts, Brendenkamp and Patillo (2010) drew a link between the reform of the international monetary system and the climate affair. They suggested (1) using available excess SDR reserves from developed countries to fill up a Green Fund dedicated to leverage capital for LCPs, (2) to consider the SDRs converted into equities of the fund as countries' reserve assets.
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This is not the type of link with the IMF, which could be derived from the system sketched in our paper. The origin of the carbon-based international reserve asset would be the carbon certificates held by Central Banks of member countries and which could accrue to their IMF account. The stock of carbon-based reserve assets would thus gradually be increased by the subscription charge in carbon certificates paid by Central Banks. The consolidation at the IMF level of the security tools presented in Sect. 3 would help strengthen the control of the total amount of carbon-based credits in circulation. This would be done by a change in the ratio a of carbon certificates per unit of investment.
A double check would thus be implemented on the system: a financial check by the IMF coupled to a physical verification of the projects' effectiveness by expert bodies near the UNFCCC would indeed guarantee that real value has been created (rails or solar plants do not vanish).
Clearing up a foggy business environment and backing a ''green'' recovery
It can legitimately be argued that, given the opportunity cost of LCPs relative to the projects that would be implemented in absence of GHG constraints, introducing a bias in their favor could crowd out other investments and eventually result in a slowdown of overall activity. But there is little chance of making such crowding out happen. First, the suggested mechanism would primarily redirect investment within the infrastructure sectors and the incremental capital cost would be only 3 %. Second, the risk of crowding out other productive investments is all the smaller as one major source of disequilibrium for the world economy is the paradox of the coexistence of a vast pool of savings and a lack of productive investment opportunities to attract borrowers (Zenghelis 2011) .
One might even argue that a carbon-based financial architecture could contribute to overcoming this paradox by changing the preference of investors over the last decade for very liquid or speculative options (US treasury bonds or real estate and commodities) at the expense of genuine investments in future potential growth. 30 The new financial economy confronts indeed potential long-term investors with a kind of ''Buridan's donkey dilemma, '' 31 the donkey that hesitated too long between eating oats or drinking water and died of hunger and thirst. A carbon-based financial architecture, instead of crowding out productive investment, could help the ''donkey'' to decide and divert part or the savings from speculative options. For example, institutional investors like pension funds currently tend to be cautious enough to avoid getting engaged with products that look safe while masking ventured assets.
This diversion from speculative options is all the timelier as the context of reduction of public and private spending to reimburse outstanding debts may generate a failure on the demand side of the economy. Within this framework, when the IMF or the European Central Bank intervene to rescue a bankrupt country, part of the financial support could be delivered under the form of carbon assets, so that it would be conditional on the launching of a wave of low-carbon investments. The difference with the traditional Keynesian compact is that credit facilities are backed on infrastructures as real assets.
Another side benefit of the issuance of carbon-based international reserve assets would be to lower the tensions on exchange rates. These risks are partly due to the high precautionary reserves accumulated in the emerging world after the 1980s/1990s financial crises in Latin America and Asia. This ''war-chest'' of official reserves is a self-insurance to protect export-led growth strategies against exchange-rate appreciation. Carbon-based reserve assets could then allow emerging economies to increase and diversify their foreign exchange reserves. They would thus be less inclined to run Balance of Payment surpluses, since they would get their reserves in proportion to emissions reductions they finance domestically. This would also contribute to spreading the gains from seigniorage and reducing the perverse effect that forces the United States to pump out more US$ assets for global reserves.
More fundamentally, carbon-based reserve assets would help solve structural imbalances of the world economy: huge capital flows from China to the United States, the 30 Ben Bernanke, Governor of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, recognized as far back as 2005: ''During the past few years, the key asset-price effects of the global saving glut appear to have occurred in the market for residential investment, as low mortgage rates have supported record levels of home construction and strong gains in housing prices. '' 31 The legend of Buridan's donkey comes from a caricature of Jean Buridan (1292 Buridan ( -1363 , professor at the University of Paris, who theorized the postponement of decisions in the hope of better information in the future. This legend is a caricature of his philosophy.
catching up of emerging economies grounded on export-led strategies sometimes at the cost of backwardness of the domestic infrastructure, undermine the social contract in many OECD countries. Carbon savings investment (World Bank 2009) of 60 % or more would benefit developing countries. Since the new carbon-based financial products could be attractive as well for private savings of emerging countries, the carbon-based finance would result in domestically reorienting a fraction of the savings that currently flow into the rich countries' banking systems. The strategic choice for these economies would thus be between (a) continuing mercantilist exchange-rate policies and purchasing power gains in favor of reserves accumulation and (b) implementing a more ''endogenous,'' inward oriented, growth pattern. This second option might become attractive with a higher guarantee that less export-oriented strategies do not lower the pace of growth and then trigger domestic social tensions.
A climate-friendly financial architecture would then help pinpoint the thin pathway between extreme rigor, which would freeze economic growth (and throw some regions into recession), and extreme laxity, which would push the burden of debt onto future generations. It would transform the climate challenge from a pure constraint to a lever for sustainable growth backed by a ''green'' content. This would have a critical impact on the developing and emerging economies, which will account for a dominant share of the infrastructure market over coming decades.
Annex 1 countries would assume their historical responsibility in the climate affair and the financial breakdown, without putting huge pressure on their weakened taxpayers. They would do so in a way consistent with their budgetary constraints and their concerns about employment and social stability. Embarked upon in the form of a forward contract, with carbon reduction as an effective underlayer, governments, industries and trade unions would then be interested in the emergence of any form of carbon price.
Conclusion
This paper starts by explaining how climate finance can get climate negotiations out of the difficulties of reaching a global deal on binding emission targets or any global carbon price signal in the near future. It ends by presenting a framework that, in addition to carbon abatement, would generate a wave of ''green growth'' recovery (Aglietta 2011; UNEP 2010a, b) through large scale infrastructure investments in both developed and developing countries.
We argue that, in the absence of global carbon markets, a massive redirection of world savings toward LCPs could be made, at least public budgetary cost, if (i) specific credit facilities, based on carbon certificates recognized as new reserve assets or new equity, were offered to LCP developers, (ii) the value of these carbon certificates, at the time of the loan, were the SCC determined by an agreement among the Parties to the UNFCCC. Such a device will make it possible to enhance the efficiency of climate finance by launching a carbon price surrogate and preventing the fragmentation of climate finance without resorting to a binding mechanism. It will encourage both unilateral initiatives and the implementation of the Green Climate Fund adopted at the Cancun Conference as part of the carbon certificates can bring additional resources to this fund. It will also incite Annex 1 countries to accelerate the launching of carbon prices that would reduce the default payment risks of LCPs and provide non-Annex 1 countries with credible financial support for development policies aligned with the UNFCCC objectives. Ultimately, when enough partners are involved in this mechanism, it might be interesting to allow the IMF to consider carbon certificates as international reserve assets.
This architecture obviously requires more in-depth general equilibrium analysis together with research on innovative financial devices and guidelines for project selection and monitoring. It deserves such efforts because it could change the political economy of climate negotiations over the short term, turning an agreement about a climate regime as a significant contribution to solve today challenges of the world economy: sustainable creation of wealth, avoiding the liquidity trap, long-term hedges against speculative bubbles and distribution of seignior age.
It could foster economic recovery without creating new excess rights to future wealth as carbon certificates have tangible counterparts such as avoided carbon emissions and newly installed infrastructures. Reorienting domestically a fraction of private savings from emerging economies, it would also contribute to calming current tensions about currencies and allow emerging countries to increase and diversify their foreign exchange reserves. It would create self-reinforcing mechanism since expanding the system would be in the interest of all countries.
6 Appendix: An illustration of the accounting circuit of carbon-based assets This appendix is not an operational proposal. It highlights the basic principles of one possible monetary circuit, which make it possible to turn CO 2 abatement into legal monetary reserves of banks. We hope that specialists in project finance will pursue, following this intuition, the quest for manageable accounting and financial devices apt to scale up climate finance.
Let us consider a low-carbon project A LCP and a business as usual project B BAU both requiring a $1000 loan in order to cover identical upfront costs. These projects differ in (a) their expected CO 2 emissions (A LCP emits 12tCO 2 less than B BAU ) and (b) the interest rate required by a bank C for a 5-year loan maturity (respectively 20 and 10 %). As a consequence, the total risk-adjusted cost of A LCP is $1600 instead of $1300 for B BAU .
Let us assume now that a government is willing to enhance the credit rating of LCPs. It decides to issue a given amount of carbon certificates (CC) and deliver them to investments and development banks in a proportion a of expected CO 2 abatement by LCPs funded by the banks. CC can be considered as a public guarantee on LCP loans aimed at reducing the interest rates required by the banks for this type of project. At this stage, this public device implies no disbursement of hard cash as CC basically consist of fiat money (with a face value defined by the SCC) that pays for ''unpriced'' services of CO 2 abatement provided by LCPs.
One key element to prompt the banks to add carbon finance on the short list of their priorities is to gradually allow the transfer of CC into banks' legal reserves after due verification that projects meet their CO 2 abatement expectations 32 and have produced the expected actual wealth. Hence, successful projects will expand further lending capacity of the bank. Figure 1 describes the articulation between monitoring mechanisms and the transformation of CC into legal reserves.
The critical point is what happens if part of the expected CO 2 abatement is not delivered. A double accounting of debt payments from A LCP is necessary to secure both the 32 In this illustration we do not present the case where CC are turned into banks' capital under the form of carbon equity.
Venturing into uncharted financial waters 183 economic and the environmental integrity of the mechanism. The mechanism goes as follows:
• With a = 0.5, bank C receives 6 CC that are directly lent to A LCP together with $ 1,000 at a reduced interest rate of, say, 10 %. CC are listed in the asset column of bank C as a loan (for a given face value of say $50 per CC) to A LCP and appear in the liability column of A LCP as a carbon debt. The liability column of A LCP is thus composed of a financial debt and a carbon debt. Both loans make A LCP deposits listed in the liability column of bank C.
• At the beginning of the operation phase of A LCP (see T 1 in Fig. 1 ), an independent authority certifies that the equipment built complies with the agreed plan 33 and allows the project proponent to reimburse say 50 % of its carbon debt in one shot. Bank C can then turn the corresponding amount of CC into legal reserves. The Central Bank recognizes these new legal reserves and makes CC become hard cash. Bank C can either deposit these reserves in its Central Bank account or use them to provide new loans. During the operation phase (see T 2 in Fig. 1 ), A LCP reimburses its financial debt with its revenues in $ and its carbon debt by abating CO 2 . At the end of the payback period (see T 3 in Fig. 1 ), an ultimate verification is carried out by the same authority. If Fig. 5 The accounting circuit of carbon-based assets 33 The auditing process does not consist of an accurate project-based verification of CO 2 abatement over the whole operation phase of the project. Instead, it aims at verifying whether the construction phase has been carried out appropriately and meets the requirements defined in the taxonomy of LCPs that allows the project to claim a conventional amount of CC.
A LCP has generated in due time the expected abatement, then it is allowed to reimburse all its remaining carbon debt.
• If the project fails to meet its abatement objective, the project proponent has to pay back uppermost the face value of the remaining carbon debt to a Green Fund. Corresponding CC are canceled and the bank cannot increase its legal reserves. This incites the bank to select projects with real environmental efficiency. Indeed, on top of not increasing its legal reserves, funding dubious projects increases the default risk of these projects and therefore potential loss for the banks as the carbon debt has to be reimbursed before the financial one (Fig. 5 ).
